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It is obvious that mathematicians throughout history have used signs of various
kinds, such as symbols, diagrams, graphs, and formulae, but they also occur in
everyday language and scientiﬁc language. The technical symbols and formulas of
mathematics have contributed in particular to its speciﬁc status, and many learning
difﬁculties have been attributed to these characteristics, which are viewed as turning
mathematics into a highly abstract and inaccessible ﬁeld of scientiﬁc enquiry. Even
for the most basic mathematical activities such as arithmetic calculations, the use of
number symbols is unavoidable, and it can also be said that much of the strength
and relevance of mathematics for applications derives from its symbolic techniques.
One could express this by stating that the “formula” was one of the great cultural
inventions and intellectual innovations, comparable in its ramiﬁcations to those of
the wheel. The use of symbolic techniques within mathematics, such as in proofs,
needs no further discussion. It is also virtually impossible to translate mathematics
into any kind of vernacular, and most mathematical “narratives” are rather mis-
leading or missing the mathematical point. To understand mathematics, one has to
do it; this doing in a very deep sense is an activity with signs and based on signs, as
should become even clearer from the following considerations.
So far most people concerned in some way or the other with mathematics will
agree with what was stated above. Pronounced differences show up when one turns
to what one can term the meaning of the signs and symbols of mathematics. In the
common understanding, signs are used to designate something that is different from
and independent of the sign, namely, the object of the sign, and this object is
viewed as the source of the meaning of the sign. Often the signs are considered as
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being secondary to what they designate and arbitrary and neutral with respect to the
mathematical content. Their main use in this view is to communicate and express
the mathematical ideas. Hersh (1986, p. 19), for instance, compared mathematics
with music, where according to him the score has solely the role of noting the music
which is already there before the score. The signs and notations in this view have no
influence on invention and creation in mathematics or music. An extreme position
in this vein was taken by Brouwer see Shapiro (2000), who considered mathematics
to be a purely mental “construction” not dependent on any sign system. In a general
way, in all these positions of mathematical realism mathematical signs and nota-
tions have been viewed as describing what have been termed mathematical objects,
whatever those might be and wherever they might be located. Thus numerals denote
numbers and diagrams denote geometric objects. Only algebraic formulas have
sometimes been spared this descriptive role, yet they have then been reduced to a
purely technical means for calculations and proofs. I will not continue these
ontological and philosophical issues any further, but these short hints should serve
to make the possible impact of the views taken by Peirce and Wittgenstein more
conspicuous.
4.2 Charles Sanders Peirce
Peirce (1839–1914) was an American mathematician, logician, and philosopher.
From among his comprehensive works, only his fundamental work in semiotics can
very briefly be considered here. Peirce developed a complex and comprehensive
theory of signs by devising a multilevel categorization of signs, starting with the
differentiation into index, icon, and symbol. With Peirce, the sign in itself has a
triadic structure of “object-representamen-interpretant,” but we will not go into any
details here. Interestingly, for decades mathematics educators apparently have not
taken note of the potential of the theories presented by Peirce. Yet Peirce was
interested in educational questions and has written a very interesting draft for a
textbook on elementary arithmetic [see the two articles by Radu in Hoffmann
(2003)].
To the best of my knowledge, it was due to the initiative taken by Michael Otte
in some of his papers (see Otte 1997, 2011) that the relevance of the semiotics of
Peirce was recognized by a growing number of mathematics educators in Germany
and elsewhere. It is impossible to adequately present the work by Otte with regard
to Peirce here because it is very complex and comprehensive. He puts Peirce and
his semiotics into the context of philosophy, epistemology and ontology by relating
it to many other strands of thought in this realm but pays less attention to the
concrete mathematical activities on and with signs. Rather, the papers by Otte
furnish a powerful background and basis for more detailed investigations into/about
how and which signs are used in mathematics and especially in mathematics
learning. On the other hand, his papers show and explicate deliberations in Peirce
that may be more general and fundamental. But it is also sensible to investigate—as
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it will be done here—a Peircean notion, such as diagrammatic reasoning, inde-
pendently from other dimensions of Peircean semiotics and its philosophical ram-
iﬁcations. In a pointed way, one could say that in Michael Otte the purview of a
sign is the whole of life, experience, and cognition, whereas here we focus on its
important role in doing and learning mathematics. To give the reader a flavour of
the work by Otte, it is instructive to cite from the abstracts of Otte (1997; my
translation from the German original) and of Otte (2011):
Peirce treats the concepts meaning, (natural) law, continuum—and some others like repre-
sentation or mind—as synonyms. By that they all acquire those paradoxical qualities which
have been since long discussed for the example of the continuum and which recently have
been addressed in different contexts, as in systems theory. The meaning of a sign, for
example, for sure cannot be separated from its application—what is already stipulated by the
Pragmatic Maxim of Peirce. On the other hand, it cannot be identiﬁed either with a single
application or with some well-deﬁned set of applications but it rather rests on the general
conditions for possible applications. The notion of sign and the concept of the continuum are
the two pillars on which Peirce’s phenomenological epistemology is based. The latter shall
be elucidated ﬁrst, through the relation to the history of mathematics; and second, through
the comparison with other phenomenological positions during the foundational crisis of
mathematics. The signiﬁcance of mathematics results from the fact that in mathematics, the
two pillars mentioned most deeply confront each other. (Otte 1997, p. 175)
One of the most salient arguments in favour of a semiotic approach… claims that semiotics
is most appropriate for treating the interaction between socio-cultural and objective aspects
of knowledge problems. If we want to take such claims seriously, however, we have to
revise our basic conceptions about reality, existence, cognition, and cultural development.
The semiotic evolutionary realism of Charles S. Peirce provides—or appears to provide—
an appropriate basis for such intentions. Man is a sign, Peirce famously said, and “thought
is more without us than within. It is we that are in it, rather than it in any of us” (Peirce CP
8.256). As there is no thought without a sign, we have to accept thoughts, concepts,
theories, or works of art as realities sui generis. Concepts or theories have to be recognized
as real before we ask for their meaning or relevance. (Otte 2011, p. 313)
An important early contribution to the dissemination of the semiotics of Peirce
was Hoffmann (Hoffmann 2005a), which explicated many aspects of Peircean
semiotics, especially with emphasis on mathematics. A related work is that by
Stjernfelt (2000), which also contains very worthwhile interpretations of ideas and
notions in Peirce. Much of this work was concerned with Peirce’s general sign
theory and its philosophical dimensions. Within mathematics education, in addition
to the triadic structure of sign, the notion of diagram and diagrammatic thinking was
mainly exploited. It should be noted that for Peirce, signs always possessed an
object that they explored in an ongoing semiotic process; the only exception was
diagrams, for which Peirce allowed the object to be ﬁctional or ideal, especially
with respect to mathematics. Before concentrating on the concept of diagrammatic
thinking, which appears to be of special value for mathematics and the learning of
mathematics, some more references on the work on (Peircean) semiotics within
German mathematics education are included: Hoffmann (2003, 2005), Hoffmann
et al. (2005), Kadunz (2010, 2015). Of course, on an international level semiotics in
general and Peircean notions in particular have also received growing attention.
Some publications illustrate this ever-extending tendency: Rotman (2000); the
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contributions to special issues in the journals ESM, ZDM, and JMD by authors
including Presmeg, Saenz-Ludlow, and Radford; and Radford et al. (2008). In
addition to the publications that have an explicit focus on semiotics, one could refer
to the vast literature on visualization and representation. Yet because in these the
signs have mostly been considered in their descriptive and representational function
(see below), this is beyond the scope of this contribution. In addition to Peirce, there
have been other semiotic traditions and theories which have been exploited in
mathematics education; for instance, Duval (1995). We now turn to the notion of
diagram and diagrammatic thinking in the form of a liberal interpretation of the
ideas of Peirce based on Dörfler (2004, 2006, 2008), where one can ﬁnd a host of
examples for diagrams and diagrammatic reasoning.
4.3 Diagrams and Diagrammatic Thinking
Peirce (3.363 in Collected Papers, this means paragraph 363 in Volume 3 according
to the standard way of citing from the papers by Peirce) made the following
comment, among others, on a basic feature of mathematics:
It has long been a puzzle how it could be that, on the one hand, mathematics is purely
deductive in its nature, and draws its conclusions apodictically, while on the other hand, it
presents as rich and apparently unending a series of surprising discoveries as any obser-
vational science. Various have been the attempts to solve the paradox by breaking down
one or other of these assertions, but without success. The truth, however, appears to be that
all deductive reasoning, even simple syllogism, involves an element of observation;
namely, deduction consists in constructing an icon or diagram the relations of whose parts
shall present a complete analogy with those of the parts of the object of reasoning, of
experimenting upon this image in the imagination, and of observing the result so as to
discover unnoticed and hidden relations among the parts…. As for algebra, the very idea of
the art is that it presents formulae, which can be manipulated and that by observing the
effects of such manipulation we ﬁnd properties not to be otherwise discerned. In such
manipulation, we are guided by previous discoveries, which are embodied in general
formulae. These are patterns, which we have the right to imitate in our procedure, and are
the icons par excellence of algebra.
I have chosen to stick to the term diagram as it has been used by Peirce and
others, though I am aware that this term might cause some misunderstandings and
arouse false expectations. First of all, the reader should dismiss all geometric
connotations. This can be seen from the above reference to Peirce, who includes
formulas of all kinds in his notion of diagram (or icon). What is important are the
spatial structure of a diagram, the spatial relationships of its parts to one another,
and the operations and transformations of and with the diagrams. The constitutive
parts of a diagram can be any kind of inscriptions such including letters, numerals,
special signs, or geometric ﬁgures.
Peirce did not nor will I give a general deﬁnition of the notion of diagram.
Instead, several descriptive features of diagrams are presented. Diagrams are based
on a kind of permanent inscription (paper, sand, screen, etc.). Those inscriptions are
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mostly planar, but some are 3-dimensional, such as models of geometric solids or
manipulatives in school mathematics. Mathematics at all levels abounds with such
inscriptions: number lines, Venn diagrams, geometric ﬁgures, Cartesian graphs,
point-line graphs, arrow diagrams (mappings), arrows in the Gaussian plane or as
vectors, and commutative diagrams (category theory); but there are also inscriptions
with a less geometric flavour: arithmetic or algebraic terms, function terms, frac-
tions, decimal fractions, algebraic formulas, polynomials, matrices, systems of
linear equations, continued fractions, and many more. There are features common
to some of these inscriptions that contribute to their diagrammatic quality as it is
understood here. However, I emphasize that not every inscription that occurs in
mathematical reasoning, learning, or teaching has a diagrammatic quality. Quite a
few of what are taken as visualizations or representations of mathematical notions
and ideas do not qualify as diagrams since they lack some of the essential features.
This is mostly the precise operative structure that for genuine diagrams permits and
invites their investigation and exploration as mathematical objects. Some widely
shared qualities of diagrams, or rather of inscriptions when used as diagrams, are
proposed in the following:
• Diagrammatic inscriptions have a structure consisting of a speciﬁc spatial
arrangement of and spatial relationships among their parts and elements. This
structure often has a conventional character.
• Based on this diagrammatic structure, there are rule-governed operations on and
with the inscriptions by transforming, composing, decomposing, or combining
them (calculations in arithmetic and algebra, constructions in geometry, and
derivations in formal logic). These operations and transformations could be
called the internal meaning of the respective diagram (compare to Wittgenstein
on meaning). Depending on the operations and transformations applied, an
inscription might give rise to essentially different diagrams. Thus, a triangular
inscription will be a general or isosceles triangle, depending on which of those
properties is used in diagrammatic arguments; this is similar to the same card
playing different roles in different card games.
• Another set of conventionalized rules governs the application and interpretation
of the diagram within and outside of mathematics, i.e., what the diagram can be
taken to denote or model. These rules could be termed the external or referential
meaning (algebraic terms standing for calculations with numbers or a graph
depicting a network or a social structure). The two meanings closely inform and
depend on each other.
• Diagrammatic inscriptions express (or can be viewed as expressing) relation-
ships by their very structure, from which those relationships must be inferred
based on the given operation rules. Diagrams are not to be understood in a
ﬁgurative but rather in a relational sense (such as a circle expressing the relation
of its peripheral points to the midpoint).
• There is a type-token relationship between the individual and speciﬁc material
inscription and the diagram of which it is an instance (such as between a written
letter and the letter as such).
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• Operations with diagrammatic inscriptions are based on the perceptive activity
of the individual (such as pattern recognition) that turns mathematics into a
perceptive and material activity.
• Diagrammatic reasoning is a rule-based but inventive and constructive manip-
ulation of diagrams for investigating their properties and relationships.
• Diagrammatic reasoning is not mechanistic or purely algorithmic; it is imagi-
native and creative. Analogy: the music of Bach is based on strict rules of
counterpoint but is highly creative and variegated.
• Many steps and arguments of diagrammatic reasoning have no referential
meaning, nor do they need any.
• In diagrammatic reasoning the focus is on the diagrammatic inscriptions irre-
spective of what their referential meaning might be. The objects of diagram-
matic reasoning are the diagrams themselves and their established properties.
• Diagrammatic inscriptions arise from many sources and for many purposes: as
models of structures and processes, by deliberate design and construction, by
idealization and abstraction from experiential reality, etc., and they are used
accordingly for many purposes.
• Efﬁcient and successful diagrammatic reasoning presupposes intensive and
extensive experience with manipulating diagrams. A comprehensive “inven-
tory” of diagrams, their properties, and relationships supports and facilitates the
creative and inventive usage of diagrams. An analogy: expert chess players have
command over a great supply of chess diagrams that guide their strategic
problem solving. Consequence: learning mathematics has to comprise dia-
grammatic knowledge of a great variety.
• Diagrams can be viewed as ideograms, such as those in Chinese writing sys-
tems. They are not translations from any natural language or abbreviations of
names and deﬁnitions; by their diagrammatic structure, they “directly” present
(to the initiated user!) their intended meaning. The latter usually is a system of
relationships (between the elements or the parts of the diagram) and of opera-
tions and transformations.
• Diagrams are composed of signs of different characters in the sense of Peirce.
There are icons, indices, and symbols as well, and a whole diagram has iconic
and symbolic functionality if in itself it is considered to be a sign in the sense of
Peirce.
To be understood and used appropriately, diagrams need to be described in
natural language and speciﬁc terms relating to the diagram. These descriptions and
explanations cannot be substituted for the diagram and its various uses, however. In
relation to the diagram and its intended relations and operations, this is a
meta-language about the diagrams, which also focuses attention and interest on its
relevant aspects and activities. It is similar to the way in which the legend on a map
of a city explains how to use that map appropriately. Generally, diagrams are
imbedded in a complex context and discourse, which is better viewed as a social
practice.
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• Diagrams are extra-linguistic signs. One cannot speak the diagram, but one can
speak about the diagram. In this sense, diagrams are irreducible entities of
mathematics (there is no mathematics without “formulas”), yet their properties
can be named by words and formulated as theorems. Thus, on the other hand
(specialized) language (as extension of natural language) is equally
indispensable.
As a ﬁnal remark: it would be misleading to consider diagrams as mathematical
objects. They are the objects and the means of mathematical activity for which we
do not have to view them as designating mathematical objects. This emphasis on
activity and concrete operations with signs leads us to Wittgenstein’s views.
4.4 Wittgenstein: Meaning as Use
The Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) dedicated a great part
of his work to the philosophy of mathematics (e.g., Wittgenstein 1999), proposing
radically alternative views on the basic character of mathematics. Together with
other features of his writings, this might have prevented any notable recognition
within mathematics education. Therefore, this contribution will (also) try to alert the
community of mathematics education to the potential of the ideas of Wittgenstein
which might (also) influence general attitudes and basic orientations of the concrete
teaching in the classroom. A caveat is, of course, that only a few aspects can be
treated here and these in only a rather superﬁcial way. The interested reader is
referred to Dörfler (2013a, 2014) and the vast literature on Wittgenstein’s philos-
ophy of mathematics, for instance, Kienzler (1997) or Mühlhölzer (2010).
Contrary to the traditional view, Wittgenstein views the meaning of many signs,
words, and symbols in general and of mathematics as well to reside in the use made
of those signs in what he calls language games or sign games. Thus, signs do not
express a meaning that exists independently of the sign game and that is given by
something outside of the sign game that the signs refer to and denote. For math-
ematics, then, the meaning of the signs, symbols, and diagrams does not come from
outside of mathematics but is created by a great variety of activities with the signs
within mathematics. This resonates very closely with the diagrammatic reasoning
described above (though Peirce would hold that thereby some independent “object”
is investigated, contrary to the position taken by Wittgenstein, which is strongly
non-metaphysical and anti-platonistic). Wittgenstein introduces the metaphor of
mathematics as a game, in particular by pointing to chess. In chess, the ﬁgures
receive all their meaning from the rules of the game, and they do not refer to
anything outside of the system of rules. The ﬁgures correspond to the signs in
mathematics and the game rules correspond to the rules in mathematics for cal-
culating, manipulating, and deriving (i.e., the diagrammatic rules in the above
sense). This game metaphor helps to solve many puzzles in math: Consider the
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“number” zero. There has been and continues to be a great deal of discussion about
what this sign denotes and how it could designate a number. In the Wittgensteinian
sense, the meaning of “0” is determined and presented by the rules for how we
calculate with it; 5 + 0 = 5 or 0 × 6 = 0, for example, reflect the origin of zero
from the place value systems. Thus, there is no mystery and no miracle about zero if
you do not ask questions that are outside the purview of math (what Wittgenstein in
a telling way calls the prose of mathematics). Very similar considerations apply to
the empty set, the “number” −1 and ﬁrst and foremost to i, the imaginary unit which
simply is determined by the rule that i × i = −1. It is a very helpful and sober way
of thinking in this way to consider the respective number systems as number games
where the meaning of the number signs flows from how they are calculated and not
from a mystical reference, say, to “nothing” or negative or imaginary magnitudes.
About those mathematical entities we can only know what is shown to us by the
results of the calculations within the number games.
To pursue this line of thinking further, we turn to the notion of grammar and
grammatical proposition as used by Wittgenstein. He says that mathematical
propositions do not describe factual situations as do propositions in science because
there are no independent mathematical objects those propositions could be about. In
his view, mathematical propositions are instead rules for how to use the terms and
signs involved in their formulation as they are developed within the various sign
games of mathematics. Or to put in still another way, in mathematics the propo-
sitions are used as rules, e.g., in proofs and calculations, though in mathematical
prose they are interpreted as accounts of mathematical facts in a mathematical
world. Examples for nonmathematical grammatical propositions would be: “White
is brighter than black,” “Every rod has a length,” “Nothing can be red and blue at
the same place,” or “Every ﬁnite set has a number.” Every arithmetic “fact” in this
view is just another rule and not the description of an eternal and absolute truth
about numbers. The concerns of many philosophers and sociologists about the
status of, say, “2 + 2 = 4” dissolve when one takes this as a rule, which of course
then can neither be veriﬁed nor falsiﬁed in an empirical interpretation. For
Wittgenstein, the whole notion of truth against this background makes no sense
since rules are neither true nor false. Rules have to be accepted; they require
consent, which is often motivated by a kind of practicability and viability. Rules are
outside of all aspects of time (in addition to questions such as when they were
established or abolished) or at least this is the way we use rules. Think again of
chess as a metaphor for the sign games of mathematics. The rules of chess usually
are not viewed as being true or eternal, and one can refuse to accept them but then
one will not be playing chess anymore. Such a view fundamentally changes one’s
attitudes and relations to mathematics and the learning of mathematics. The practice
and fluency in sign games is now the centrepiece and not the mental grasp of ideal
and abstract objects or of “ideas” which are just denoted and represented by the
mathematical signs. The learner has to indulge in the mathematical “games”
whereby meaning and understanding gradually will develop. In mathematics,
meaning cannot be imported from outside but emerges inside it through manifold
activities. Wittgenstein was often blamed for the apparent conventional and thus
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possibly arbitrary character of mathematics derived from his views. Yet to counter
this, one can point to the fact that many basic rules (axioms) are motivated by
practical or theoretical demands and that many other rules are then derived from
given ones by proofs and calculations. On the other hand, there is in fact a great
liberty regarding the rules according to which one wants to do the mathematics and
this holds as well for the logic involved.
As Wittgenstein says, mathematics can be viewed as the grammar or the
grammatical study of its signs and terms. This proves especially helpful wherever a
notion of the “inﬁnite” turns up, which notoriously poses great obstacles for
learners. Historically it is interesting that Leibniz remarked that for his inﬁnitesi-
mals such as dx, one should not look for referents, that is, objects that are denoted
by them. He took the view that they are completely determined by the rules gov-
erning how to operate with them. These rules, on the other hand, were motivated by
the problems that Leibniz wanted to solve. In Wittgenstein’s terms, the inﬁnitesi-
mals make sense and have meaning within the sign game developed by Leibniz but
are meaningless outside of it. Similarly, a chess ﬁgure has no isolated meaning as
such, no absolute meaning independent of the whole game and its rules. Meaning
always depends on the respective language game or sign game and also reference of
the signs to objects will be controlled by the language game. An extreme case in
mathematics is the notion of inﬁnite set and inﬁnite cardinal number. It might be
difﬁcult for the learner to take a naïve Platonist stance viewing set theory as
descriptive of a universe of prefabricated sets (as in Gödel or in Deiser 2010). With
Wittgenstein, one can interpret set theory as one possible answer to the question of
how one could sensibly talk about inﬁnity. That not every such talk is sensible was
shown by the well-known paradoxes. The deﬁnitions and the propositions of set
theory then are the rules within a language game that develop the grammar of
“inﬁnity,” and as is known, different such grammars are possible and sensible.
Researching the inﬁnite then becomes the more mundane activity of exploring rule
systems in regard to their consequences, which is still a wonderful intellectual
achievement. The “inﬁnitely large” becomes part of the prose of math. Again we
ﬁnd that it is not some external object (inﬁnite set) that regulates how mathematics
is done but mathematics itself that determines how one can view the inﬁnite, which
in a way emerges in the respective language game. It should be clear that such
views and attitudes bring mathematics back to the purview of human beings, which
does not make it any easier to learn but possibly arouses less fear and anxiety about
an inaccessible realm far beyond one’s reach.
The ﬁnal notion in Wittgenstein to be mentioned briefly is that of “norm” or
“paradigm.” In connection with the notions of language game, grammar, and rule
use, it permits the dissolution of some of the notorious enigmas ascribed to
mathematics: the necessity or unavoidability of mathematics. Mathematics cannot
be otherwise and alternatives are not conceivable as is possible for statements, say,
about nature. There is no change in mathematics, mathematics is timeless, and its
propositions are eternally true and they are exactly true, not only approximately.
Furthermore, there is the puzzle of the applicability of mathematics to nature,
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though the latter is seen as categorically different from mathematics. The way out of
many of these enigmas proposed by Wittgenstein is to recognize that mathematical
notions and propositions in many cases are used as a norm, as a measuring stick
against which something is judged and evaluated. We use established arithmetic
rules to judge the correctness of calculations and of counting: Only what conforms
to the rules is considered to be acceptable. Those arithmetic propositions and
relations are not used as descriptions of eternally true properties of numbers but as
templates to carry out and to check the correctness of other calculations, even if the
prose tells us otherwise. The mathematical circle, or the mathematical sphere in this
sense, is not used as an object but again as a rule to which something to be called a
circle or a sphere has to conform. Those uses of math are not descriptive but rather
prescriptive or evaluative. Again as with rules, norms or paradigms have no truth
value and all the conundrums about mathematical objects for them simply do not
make sense. It is the use made of mathematics that makes it timeless, eternal,
apodictic, necessary, and, in a trivial sense, true, since that truth results from
accepting something as a rule, a norm, or a paradigm. Mathematical propositions
are not used as descriptions of facts but are used as rules for description. There is
therefore no need to ascribe to them or to mathematical objects any ontological
status, since their “reality” resides in their uses within the sign games of mathe-
matics. At least this Wittgenstein would very likely agree with.
4.5 Conclusion
The main purpose of this contribution is to arouse more interest in the views on
mathematics and mathematical activity proposed by Peirce and especially
Wittgenstein, whose ideas were often overlooked within math education. For some
possible consequences of Wittgensteinian ideas for learning mathematics, see
Dörfler (2014). A common theme for both of these men is that human intellectual
and linguistic activity is fundamentally based on signs of all sorts, and this applies
all the more to mathematics. The signs are not just a means or a tool for mathe-
matical activity and creativity, but they are essential and constitutive for mathe-
matics, its notions, and propositions and their meanings. Thus for Peirce, to learn
mathematics would be to acquire expertise in diagrammatic reasoning, and for
Wittgenstein, it would be to participate in the many various sign games and their
techniques. In both cases, which are closely related, it is of great importance to stick
meticulously to established rules. This holds for pure mathematics and its proof
techniques and for the manifold ways of applying mathematics to other ﬁelds.
Importantly, mathematics is thereby fundamentally shown to be a deeply social and
socially shared cultural activity and product: sign activity can be executed with
others and shown to others in a public form. This is very different from imagining
mathematics as a kind of abstract and mental activity.
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